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Chapter 1    
 
The Right Not to Be Displaced by Armed Conflict under International Law 
 
Elena Katselli Proukaki 
 
1 Introduction 
 
With 38 million persons currently displaced by armed conflict, violence and serious human rights 
violations,1 and with the conflict in Syria still unfolding with increased intensity and gravity forcing 
people out of their homes,2 it is not difficult to see that forcible displacement caused by armed conflict 
and serious human rights violations presents a significant moral and legal challenge. It is because of 
the ‘enormous injustice’3 that forcible displacement causes that the Colombian Constitutional Court 
described it as ‘a problem of humanity’.4 In addition to this, forcible displacement has a domino effect 
on the enjoyment of a web of fundamental human rights well protected under customary and 
conventional law. Such is the magnitude of devastation that it brings both on its victims and 
international peace and security that it is imperative to prevent its occurrence and when this is 
unavoidable to remedy its aftermath effects. Nevertheless, and as Stavropoulou highlighted 20 years 
ago, ‘The failure of international law to address the issue of displacement in a comprehensive manner 
                                                          
1 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, A/HRC/32/35, 29 April 2016, 7. 
2 ‘Mid-Year Trends 2015’, UNHCR, 3, 
<http://www.unhcr.org/56701b969.html#_ga=1.238359107.297000490.1455875838>  
3 de Zayas A.M. (1975), ‘International Law and Mass Population Transfers’, HILJ, Vol. 16, 207, 208, fn 12. 
4 Colombian Constitutional Court, Decision T-227 of 1997, per Justice Alejandro Martinez Caballero quoted in Colombian 
Constitutional Court, Decision T-025 of 2004, 15. 
2 
 
results in undeniable gaps in the international protection system.’5 Despite the significant 
developments since then, including the adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement6 
and the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (Pinheiro 
Principles),7 these gaps continue to prevail today as evident from the growing wave of forcibly 
displaced persons across the world. Whilst currently the main attention is placed on solutions following 
the uprooting of individuals, there is weaker emphasis on the prohibition of displacement. Importantly, 
the notion of an individual right not to be displaced under international law has been neglected. This 
is so even though according to Principle 5 of the Pinheiro Principles, ‘Everyone has the right to be 
protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home, land or place of habitual residence’.8 
This is because the Pinheiro Principles are not legally binding presenting a legal vacuum in the 
prohibition of displacement as a fundamental human right.9 The existing international legal standards 
have therefore proved inadequate and too fragmented to effectively protect individuals from such 
uprooting. This has even encouraged states to wrongly perceive the question of forced displacement 
as a matter that falls within their sovereign powers that can be negotiated, through for instance peace 
agreements.  
 
                                                          
5 Stavropoulou M. (1994), ‘The Right not to be Displaced’, AUILR, Vol. 9, No 3, 689-749, 738-39. 
6 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998. Prepared by UN SG’s 
Representative on internally displaced persons Mr Francis Deng, 1998. 
7 UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, <http://globalinitiative-
escr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Pinheiro-Principles-Publication.pdf>. Developed by Special Rapporteur on Housing 
and Property Restitution for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, adopted by UN Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2005.  
8 Ibid.  
9 ‘The Human Rights Dimensions of Population Transfers including the Implantation of Settlers’, Preliminary Report 
prepared by AS Al-Khasawneh and R Hatano, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17 6 July 1993, [372] (Al-Khasawneh/Hatano report). 
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This chapter fills this gap by establishing that contemporary international law recognises an individual 
right to be protected from forced displacement that results from armed conflict, whether between states 
(inter-state) or between a state and non-state actors (internal) and serious human rights violations.10 As 
it will be shown, such right, albeit not absolute, has its grounding on international human rights law 
(IHRL), international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL) and it is now well 
embedded in international customary law.  
 
The significance of recognising an autonomous individual right not to be displaced by armed conflict 
lies in the fact that such right cannot be disposed of - including through peace agreements - save in 
exceptional circumstances recognised by international law, hence restricting considerably the powers 
of the parties involved in the conflict. Moreover, the existence of a right not to be displaced, as with 
all human rights, burdens states with negative and positive obligations to protect individuals from 
being displaced, including by taking all necessary measures to protect them from the conduct of non-
state actors.11 Whilst this is not sufficient to eliminate forced displacement, the recognition that 
individuals cannot be displaced as of right can nevertheless increase the pressure upon states and non-
state actors to prevent or end its occurrence, fill existing legal gaps and strengthen the protection 
afforded to those affected by it. Moreover, and whilst of course the existence of such a right does not 
in itself presume capacity to bring a claim before national or international (judicial or other) bodies, 
nor enforcement, as discussed in Section 7, it nevertheless means that the individual affected by 
                                                          
10 An inter-state armed conflict comes to an end with the ‘general conclusion of peace’ whereas an internal armed conflict 
comes to an end with the conclusion of a peaceful settlement. Prosecutor v Gotovina et at, TC, IT-06-90-T, 15 April 2011, 
[1676]. 
11 n5, 738; Sassoli M. (2002), ‘State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, IRRC, Vol. 84, 401, 
411. 
4 
 
violation of the right not to be displaced can make a legal demand for the respect of their right and for 
the cessation of the wrongful act. Fundamentally,  
 
The right not to be displaced can have one obvious and very significant advantage. It can 
provide the people who are in danger of being displaced with a claim that can assist them 
in drawing attention to a serious human rights problem which encapsulates a whole range 
of human rights abuses … The issue of empowerment is of paramount importance in the 
realization of human rights.12 
 
In this regard, establishing a strong legal framework not only on the obligation not to displace in armed 
conflict or as  a result of serious human rights violations but also on a corresponding, autonomous 
human right not to be displaced is an essential step towards ensuring protection against displacement 
in these circumstances, alongside effective mechanisms and access to remedies such as is the case with 
other serious violations of human rights.13  This in turn has significant ramifications upon the legal 
consequences that arise from the violation of such right, such as the right to restitution and the right of 
those displaced to return home which are discussed in detail in the next chapter.   
 
For a new human right to exist however it will have, among others, to ‘reflect a fundamentally 
important social value’; ‘be eligible for recognition’ under customary law and general principles of 
law; ‘be consistent with, but not merely repetitive of, the existing body of international human rights 
law’; attract ‘a very high degree of international consensus’; ‘be compatible or at least not clearly 
incompatible with the general practice of states’; and ‘be sufficiently precise as to give rise to 
                                                          
12 n5, 745. 
13 n3, 227. 
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identifiable rights and obligations’.14 The analysis in this chapter demonstrates that these conditions 
are satisfied rendering strong support for the existence of the right not to be displaced.  
 
For the purposes of this chapter, forcible displacement is given effect either through forcible transfer 
of population, deportation which occurs when a national border is crossed, or other measures intended 
to move certain group out of specific territory. It is usually part of planned policies for acquiring new 
territory, for creating ethnically homogenous areas or even for the destruction of a certain part of the 
population as part of a broader genocidal plan. It is also inflicted upon its victims under duress leaving 
them no other option but to flee.15 One must however not neglect the simple fact that individuals often 
‘choose’ to abandon their homes and land to protect themselves and their families from death and other 
serious human rights violations.16 Hence, displacement is pursued by the victims themselves as the 
less of two evils. This could not be truer as evident from the mass exodus of populations, such as that 
currently experienced in the context of the Syrian conflict, in search of security elsewhere. Protection 
against displacement, as advanced in this chapter, is not intended to prevent the exercise of other rights 
such as the right to seek and enjoy asylum.17 Nevertheless, the fact that individuals should be allowed 
to leave must not overshadow the primary obligation of states and non-state actors to ensure the 
protection of civilians from displacement by respecting their obligations under IHL and IHRL, as well 
                                                          
14 Alston P. (1984), ‘Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control’, AJIL, Vol. 78, 607, 615; also see 
analysis in n5, 694. 
15 Prosecutor v Krstic case, Judgment, IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, [521]-[523]. 
16 Zapater J., ‘Prevention of Forced Displacement: The Inconsistencies of a Concept’ (UNHCR: Policy Development and 
Evaluation Service) Research Paper No 186, April 2010, 3, < 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/research/working/4bbb2a199/prevention-forced-displacement-inconsistencies-concept-josep-
zapater.html?query=forced displacement>  
17 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner´s Programme, Note on International Protection, 31 August 1993, 
A/AC.96/815, [37]. 
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as the right of individuals to remain in their homes under conditions of safety.18 Accordingly, the term 
‘forced displacement’ is used in this chapter to indicate lack of genuine choice on the part of the 
individuals concerned because of conflict and human rights violations.19 At the same time however 
forced displacement is distinguished from temporary protective measures taken during conflict to 
evacuate the civilian population for their own safety, and hence, forced displacement is associated with 
action which is not justified under international law. This issue is further addressed in detail below. 
 
It is further important to clarify that this chapter is concerned with the forced displacement, ‘through 
expulsion or other coercive means’20 of those who lawfully reside within the territory from which they 
are expelled, without making a distinction between nationals and non-nationals. Even though different 
people within a state may have different legal status and hence may be covered by different 
international rules, such as for instance enemy aliens the deportation of whom during armed conflict 
is arguably permitted under international law,21 this chapter will not focus on these distinctions. Nor 
will the chapter draw a distinction between the internally displaced and refugees. This is because forced 
displacement caused by armed conflict and serious human rights violations has severe repercussions 
on those affected by it irrespective of nationality and whether an international border has been crossed. 
To this effect, the chapter will consider the existence of the right not to be displaced as a matter of a 
general rule. Finally, this chapter does not address displacement caused because of natural or 
environmental disasters, development or economic migration, which albeit important, they do not fall 
within the scope of this examination. 
                                                          
18 Phuong C. (2005), The International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (Cambridge, CUP) 124. 
19 n16, 18. 
20 Popovic case, Judgement, IT-05-88-T, 10 June 2010, [891]. 
21 Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Civilians Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23, 27-32, 17 December 
2004, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XXVI, 195-247. 
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Having explained what forced displacement is and why the recognition of a stand-alone right not to be 
displaced by armed conflict and serious human rights violations is essential, Section 2 examines how 
forced displacement was addressed – if at all – by international law at the rise of the 20th century. 
Sections 3, 4 and 5 focus on how the law on forced displacement evolved following the end of World 
War II (WWII), arguing that a stand-alone right not to be displaced by armed conflict and serious 
human rights violations exists in light of international humanitarian, international criminal and 
international human rights law. Section 6 assesses further evidence of state practice and opinio juris 
in support of the right not to be displaced in the circumstances under consideration whilst Section 7 
discusses the significance of having such a right and a remedy under international law. Section 8 
concludes this analysis. 
 
2 Displacement and Dispossession in the early 20th Century  
 
To assist us understand how forced displacement is regulated today, this section examines how 
international law responded to specific events which led to the forced displacement of populations in 
the early 20th century. In doing so, it provides a forum for a comparative discussion of whether, and if 
so to what extent, contemporary international treaty and customary law evolved towards establishing 
a right not to be displaced by armed conflict and serious human rights violations.  
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The prohibition of forced displacement through deportation found recognition in article 23 of the 
Lieber Code,22 whilst population transfer, a more recently evolved concept,23 was prohibited under 
customary law.24 Whilst the 1907 Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War  on 
Land (1907 Hague Convention) concerning inter-state conflict and still in force today does not 
expressly prohibit forced displacement,25 articles 42-56 regulating belligerent occupation have been 
construed as impliedly protecting against this practice.26 Of particular relevance is article 43 which 
obliges the occupying power ‘to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.’27 On its part, article 46 
provides that ‘Family honour and rights, the lives of persons and private property, as well as religious 
convictions and practices must be respected.’ This, together with articles 47-53 which prohibit among 
others pillage and collective punishment against the population,28 could be interpreted as inferring a 
duty not to move the civilian population from territory.29  
                                                          
22 The Lieber Code (Washington D.C., 24 April 1863) in Friedman L. (ed.) (1973), The Law of War, a Documentary History 
(New York, Random House) Vol. I. 
23 Bassiouni M.C. (2011), Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge, 
CUP) 380. 
24 n3, 213. 
25 This was because deportations were already prohibited under international law. See ibid, 211. 
26 Ibid, 212. 
27 Quigley observes that the English translation is wrong and that in fact article 423requires the occupying power to 
‘maintain la vie public’, meaning the preservation of ‘general safety and social functions and ordinary transactions which 
constitute daily life’; Quigley J. (1998), ‘Displaced Palestinians and a Right to Return’, HILJ, Vol. 38, 171, 198, fn 154. 
28 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907 in 2 AJIL (1908) 90 (Supp) 1. Also see Convention (II) with 
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899; (Al-Khasawneh/Hatano report), n9, [154]. 
29 n23, 381-82. 
9 
 
 
Despite this, forced population transfers and deportations were common practices following the end 
of the Balkan Wars and World War I (WWI),30 such as the transfers that took place between Bulgaria 
and Greece, and Bulgaria and Turkey.31 Significantly, with the conclusion of the Convention 
Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations of 30 January 1923, more than one million 
Greeks were forced to leave their homes in Minor Asia and Eastern Thrace and were transferred to 
territories then controlled by Greece. Similarly, between 350,000 and 500,000 Muslims were 
transferred to Turkey.32 Those transferred were prevented from returning to their homes, whilst 
receiving unsatisfactory compensation.33 As article 1 of the Convention provided, ‘as from May 1st, 
1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox 
religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in 
Greek territory. These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the 
authorization of the Turkish government or of the Greek government respectively.’34 The immovable 
property of the exchanged populations would be liquidated and passed to the state, whilst both the 
population exchange and the liquidation would be monitored by a Mixed Commission set up for this 
purpose.35 The right to remain or to return and to enjoy full rights including the right to property was 
limited to those inhabitants of districts which were exempted from such transfers such as for instance 
the ‘established’ inhabitants of Constantinople. At the same time however, under the Declaration 
                                                          
30 See i.e. Article 14, Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne, 24 July 1923.  
31 See i.e. Annex to the Peace Treaty of Constantinople on 15 November 1913.  
32 n3, 222. 
33 Wolff S., ‘Can Forced Population Transfers Resolve Self-determination Conflicts? A European Perspective’, 
<http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/ethniccleansing.pdf>  
34 Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Lausanne, January 30, 1923 in 18 AJIL (Apr 
1924) No 2, Supplement, 84-90. 
35 Ibid, Articles 9 and 11.  
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Relating to Moslem Properties in Greece, the Greek government undertook to restore the property 
rights of those Muslims who did not fall within the Convention on the exchange of populations and 
who had left Greece before 1912.36  
 
It seems from the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations that the 
forcible population exchange aimed at the creation of religiously ‘pure’ territories ‘eliminating’ the 
perceived problems arising from the existence of minorities which caused political unrest. This 
explains why the right to return and the right to property were retained for some but not for other 
populations in the aftermath of WWI. This situation, which was given legitimacy through treaty law, 
presented a paradox since forced deportations, through population exchanges, were endorsed in 
parallel with treaties which aimed to protect the rights of  minorities and their link to territory.37 The 
issues relating to the compulsory exchange of populations in this instance were brought before the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations 
Case in which the Court, whilst not considering the lawfulness of such transfer, did not challenge it.38 
In this way, as Bassiouni notes, the Court ‘implicitly’ accepted the legality of such transfer.39 This was 
despite the fact that as a result of the transfers those affected were left homeless and destitute.40 As de 
Zayas observes, ‘state interests were given preference over the interests of humanity.’41 
 
                                                          
36 Declaration Relating to Moslem Properties in Greece in 18 AJIL (Apr 1924) No 2, Supplement, 95-6. 
37 Weitz E.D. (2008), ‘From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human 
Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions’, AHR, Vol. 113, No 5, 1313-43; n27, 206. 
38 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, PCIJ (1925) Ser. B, No. 11, 6. 
39 Bassiouni M.C. (1999), Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law, (The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer 
Law International) 321. 
40 McM W. (1953), ‘In Memoriam: Allen T Burns’, SSR, Vol. 27, No 2, 218. 
41 n3, 222. 
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By contrast, and whilst such forced exchanges and deportations were embedded in several treaties 
following WWI, the deportation of civilians which was carried out by Germany and its allies during 
the war was considered by the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War and the 
Enforcement of Penalties as a crime against the laws of humanity.42 In its report the Commission 
concluded that the deportation of 1 million Armenians and 400,000 Greeks living in Thrace and in 
Minor Asia, both carried out by Turkish authorities, as well as the deportation of 1 million Greek-
speaking Turks living in Turkey by Turkish and German authorities constituted such crimes.43 This 
was so irrespective of whether such acts were directed against nationals (crimes against the laws of 
humanity) or against non-nationals (war crimes).44 Yet, these crimes were left unpunished because the 
United States opposed the Commission’s report on the ground that the concept of crimes against the 
laws of humanity did not at that time have international legal basis.45 Significantly, the Treaty of Sevres 
which required the prosecution of Turkish officials and the return of those deported to their homes was 
never ratified, whilst the Treaty of Lausanne offered amnesty for such crimes.46 Such amnesty not only 
failed to punish those responsible for such acts, but it also endorsed them.47 This set ‘a very bad 
precedent in international law, in that it approved the first compulsory transplanting of peoples from 
lands where their ancestors had lived for many hundred years.’48 Even so, it becomes evident from this 
analysis that whilst states condemned deportations carried out by Germany and Turkey during WWI, 
                                                          
42 Report by the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 14 AJIL (Jan 
– Apr, 1920) No 1 / 2, 95, 114. 
43 n39, 321. 
44 Ibid, 321 and 322. 
45 n42, 149. 
46 n39, 314. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid, 314. 
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the Peace Agreements authorised deportations carried out by Allied powers. Such population 
exchanges are unlawful under contemporary international law,49 an issue discussed in detail below. 
 
Exchanges of populations were also authorised under the Convention of Neuilly between Greece and 
Bulgaria of November 27th, 1919, which provided for ‘the reciprocal emigration of the racial, religious 
and linguistic minorities in Greece and Bulgaria.’50 In its Advisory Opinion in The Greco-Bulgarian 
‘Communities’ the PCIJ emphatically reiterated that the very aim of the Convention was ‘that the 
individuals forming the communities should respectively make their homes permanently among their 
own race, the very mentality of the population concerned’.51 This however presents an endorsement of 
a policy of unlawful and arbitrary discrimination driving those not belonging in the majority out of 
such territories and depriving individual members of such communities of their fundamental rights 
such as the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, their right to home and their right to family life. 
This is despite the fact that unlike the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, article 1 of the 
Convention of Neuilly provided for the voluntary emigration of those desiring to do so rather than their 
forced transfer.52 One can of course question whether such population exchanges are genuinely 
voluntary.53 Concerning the property of those who decided to leave, article 7 provided that any real 
property belonging to them would be liquidated. The amount obtained from the value of the property 
would then be transferred to the owners of the property. However, as the PCIJ stressed, only those who 
                                                          
49 n3, 222.  
50 Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Emigration, 14 AJIL (Oct, 1920) No 4, Supplement, 
356-60. 
51 The Greco-Bulgarian ‘Communities’ (Advisory Opinion), PCIJ, Series B, No 17, July 31 1930, 21. 
52 According to Nestor, a compulsory exchange of populations would be a breach of fundamental human rights. Nestor S. 
(1962), ‘Greek Macedonia and the Convention of Neuilly (1919)’ BS, 169-84, 181. 
53 Al-Khasawneh/Hatano report, n9, [118]. 
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decided to emigrate would be able to benefit from the liquidation of property which belonged to the 
dissolved community.54 In this instance too, the emigration and liquidation process would be observed 
by a Mixed Commission.  
 
From the analysis above it is clear that practice in relation to displacement through deportations and 
population transfers during and following WWI was inconsistent and in many cases conflicting. This 
was so despite the protections, albeit restricted to situations of occupation, afforded under the 1907 
Hague Convention, and customary international law discussed above. In fact, such practice reveals 
that states considered forced displacement given effect to ‘homogenise’ the newly created or expanded 
states as a desirable political, ethnic, racial and religious objective which would put an end to the 
problems surrounding the existence of minorities. This may be explained by the lack of express 
prohibition of forced displacement and lack of recognition of the right not to be displaced. Such 
absence is owed to the predominantly state-centred nature of the international legal order at the time 
under consideration whereby individuals had no recognised international legal standing or personality 
and were subjected to the absolute, and often abusive, power of the state.55 The evolution of human 
rights and the idea that individuals possess inherent fundamental rights and freedoms by virtue of being 
human were embodied in international law at a much later stage following the devastating effects of 
WWII. It therefore comes as no surprise that issues relating to displacement fell within the exclusive 
power of states. As the analysis in this section demonstrates states could decide through the conclusion 
of international agreements to force entire communities outside specific territories, in a move that 
today would be considered a violation of international law.56   
                                                          
54 n51, 26 and 31. 
55 Bugnion F. (2004-2005), ‘Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and International Humanitarian Law’, FInte’lLJ, Vol. 
28, 1397, 1406. 
56 n27, 224. 
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This being said, forced displacement was also a common phenomenon during and after WWII. It is for 
instance estimated that after the war 15 million people – mainly Germans – were expelled from their 
homes to create ethnically ‘pure’ regions to avoid future conflict.57 This was despite the fact that the 
deportation of civilians from occupied territory was recognised as a war crime and a crime against 
humanity under Article 6 (c) of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) Charter,58 the 1945 Allied 
Control Council Law No. 10,59 the 1946 IMT Charter (Tokyo) and the Nuremberg Principles.60 Indeed, 
one of the charges against those accused before the IMT was the assimilation of occupied territories 
by the occupied power and their alienation from their former ethnic, national, economic, cultural 
character through the forcible deportation of the civilian population and the settlement of nationals of 
the occupying power.61 In the Case of Greifelt and others for instance the accused faced prosecution 
                                                          
57 n33; also see Korn D.A. (1999), Exodus Within Borders: An Introduction to the Crisis of Internal Displacement 
(Brookings Institution Press) 7-9; de Zayas A.M. (1993), The German Expellees: Victims in War and Peace (Palgrave 
Macmillan). 
58 Article 6, United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution 
and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis ("London Agreement"), 8 August 
1945, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b39614.html>. Also see Trial of the Major War Criminals (1947), 
Military Legal Resources, <https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/NT_major-war-criminals.html>; Affirmation of the 
Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), UN. Doc 
A/64/Add.l, (1946) 188; Henckaerts J.M. (2009), ‘The grave breaches regime as customary international law’, JICJ, Vol. 
7, No 4, 683-701, 689-90. 
59 Article II, Allied Control Council No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and 
against Humanity, Berlin, 20 December 1945. 
60 Article 5 (c) Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo, 19 January 1946, amended on 26 
April 1946; Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Second Session, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. 
No. 12, Principle 6(c), U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), in YbILC, Vol. 2, 374 (1950). 
61 2 IMT 57, Count 3, J discussed in n39. 
15 
 
for crimes against humanity and war crimes for population evacuations from native land occupied or 
otherwise controlled by Germany and resettlement of own population, expulsions and population 
transfers as well as for confiscations and plundering of public and private property with no 
compensation offered.62 Such measures intended to Germanise the population as well as the territories 
annexed or occupied by the Nazis and were carried out through ‘intimidation, deceit or mere force’.63 
Evacuees were often given little time to collect their personal belongings whilst families were split up 
hence severing family ties.64 Often such measures took place as part of genocidal plans.65  
 
Hence it is surprising that whilst deportation was prosecuted as a war crime and a crime against 
humanity, at the same time it was used as the object of international agreements concluded at the end 
of the war.66 Such is the Potsdam Agreement with which the United States, the United Kingdom and 
the Union of Soviet Social Republics agreed ‘the transfer to Germany of German populations, or 
elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary’ even though such transfers were 
to be carried out ‘in an orderly and humane manner.’67 This move was considered essential to ‘de-
                                                          
62 Trial of Ulrich Greifelt and others, United States Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 10 October 1947 – 10 March 1948 in 
Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals. UN War Crimes Commission. Vol. XIII. London: HMSO, 1949, 3 and 25-6, 
<https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-13.pdf>  
63 Ibid, 20. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid, 25. On deportations and forcible transfer also see Greiser case, Judgment, 7 July 1946, Supreme National Tribunal 
at Poznan, Poland; List (Hostages Trial) case, Judgment, 19 February 1948, Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, USA; 
Eichmann case, Judgment, 12 December 1961, District Court of Jerusalem, Israel. 
66 Al-Khasawneh/Hatano report, n9, [11]. 
67 Article XII, The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945, Protocol of the Proceedings, August l, 1945, 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp>  
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nazify’ the defeated German state.68 Hence, one cannot but notice the differentiated treatment towards 
the population transfers agreed by Allied powers resulting in the expulsion of 15 million Germans.69 
Bassiouni is of the belief however that the IMT missed the opportunity to draw a distinction between 
population transfers resulting from territorial adjustments and those which are carried out for 
discriminatory reasons or for the extermination of the transferred population.70 However, this author 
is not convinced that transfers carried out as part of territorial re-arrangements, or even as a result of 
peace agreements are not problematic, as they themselves raise issues relating to discrimination whilst 
such distinction can be open to abuse. This was recognised by the International Law Institute in 1952 
according to which ‘international population transfer is never a means to protect human rights’ and 
that ‘To suggest that population transfer somehow works to the advantage of the affected populations, 
then, is to fail to make the important distinction between the interest of the individual and the interest 
of the State.’71 As rightly put, ‘[l]’ intérêt de la communauté internationale ne peut pas justifier la 
violation du Droit.’72 To this effect, the forced displacement of the population, either through 
population transfers or other means, is today legally contested as the populations and individuals 
concerned should be allowed to remain in their homes unless otherwise authorised under international 
law.73 
 
                                                          
68 n3, 233. 
69 Brownlie I. (1963), International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford, OUP) 408. For a critique of such expulsions also 
see de Zayas A. (1988), Nemesis at Potsdam: The Expulsions of the Germans from the East (Bison Books). 
70 n39, 315. 
71 Al-Khasawneh/Hatano report, n9, [362]. 
72 G Scalle in 44/2 Annuaire (1952) 180 in n3, 226. 
73 In support see Al-Khasawneh/Hatano report, n9, [43]; also see in this regard n 3, 250; n27, 224. 
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The preceding analysis has therefore shown that following WWI and WWII practice on forced 
population transfers, and in effect forced displacement, was inconsistent.74 Whilst such transfers were 
criminalised in the context of occupation, they were encouraged under peace agreements.75 
Nevertheless, the legal developments that followed the end of WWII through the development of IHL, 
ICL and IHRL not only restrain, but in fact prohibit altogether the power of the state  to ‘homogenise’ 
or ‘purify’ territory through displacement, whether this is carried out during armed conflict or 
occupation, or as a result of peace agreements or discriminatory practices.76 At the same time, a right 
not to be forcibly displaced has indeed evolved in contemporary international law, the legal basis of 
which is discussed in detail in the next sections. The examination will start with an analysis of the rules 
of IHL and then proceed to an analysis of how individuals are protected against displacement under 
ICL and IHRL. 
 
3 The Legal Basis of the Right not to be Displaced under International Humanitarian Law 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Armed conflict is the armed force between states or protracted armed violence between states and 
organised non-state groups or between non-state groups within a state.77 As well known, armed conflict 
engages the rules of IHL which regulate the means and methods of warfare and protect those caught 
                                                          
74 For further analysis on WWII forced expulsions, Al-Khasawneh/Hatano report, n9, [128]-[137]. 
75 On population transfers following WWII see n3, 207. 
76 For brief analysis see ‘Exchange of Populations’, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/exchange-of-
population.htm>; Ullom V. (2000-2001), ‘Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees and Customary International Law’, 
DJIL&P, Vol. 29, 115, 116. 
77 Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, [70]. 
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in armed conflict, whether civilians or those no longer taking part in hostilities from the acts of states 
and non-state actors.78 Armed conflict is therefore an essential requirement for the invocation of IHL 
whose rules are embodied in international agreements and customs.79 As the analysis below 
demonstrates, IHL has a wealth of treaty and customary rules aimed at protecting civilians from 
displacement.80 It is violation of these rules, such as for instance indiscriminate attacks against civilians 
prohibited under Article 51 of Additional Protocol I (API),81 that force civilians to abandon their 
homes.82 As Bugnion correctly points out, ‘If they are upheld, these provisions – which protect all 
civilian persons – eliminate the main reasons people are uprooted in times of war. They kick in before 
refugee law does, protecting civilians against forcible transfers and the threat of uprooting, whose 
devastating effects are all too familiar, and hence from the risk of becoming refugees or displaced 
persons.’83 As it will be argued, these rules support the claim that an individual right not to be displaced 
exists. 
 
3.2 Prohibition of forced displacement under the Geneva law 
                                                          
78 See n 55, 1400 and 1404; Commentary of 1958, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War of 12 August 1949, 37.   
79 Greer J.L., ‘Critique of the ICRC’s Customary Rules Concerning Displaced Persons: General 
Accuracy, Conflation, and a Missed Opportunity’, 1, < 
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/hrlc/documents/publications/hrlcommentary2007/acritiqueoficrcscustomaryrulesondisplac
edpersons.pdf>; n55, 1402. 
80 Bugnion, ibid, 1404; Zegveld L. (2003), ‘Remedies for Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, IRRC, 
Vol. 85, No 851, 501. 
81 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. 
82 n55, 1420. 
83 Ibid, 1407. 
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Unlike The Hague Regulations, and in significant progression of international law, the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 expressly prohibit the forced displacement of populations in inter-state and 
internal armed conflict, hence recognising the devastating effects of displacement and the necessity to 
prevent and end it as a serious violation of international law. Importantly, the express prohibition of 
forced displacement, including deportation and forcible transfer, is in essence recognition of the 
individual right not to be displaced. As the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTFY) emphasised, ‘the legal values protected by deportation and forcible transfer are the “right of 
the victim to stay in his or her home and community and the right not to be deprived of his or her 
property by being forcibly displaced to another location”.’84  
 
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (IV GC), which applies in inter-state conflict, prohibits 
individual or mass forcible transfer and deportation from occupied territory irrespective of the reasons 
behind such act.85 This prohibition is absolute and cannot be deviated from even in ‘the most 
compelling security considerations’.86 Nevertheless, article 49 allows ‘the total or partial evacuation 
of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.’ Yet, such 
evacuation is subject to restrictions since the persons concerned must not be transferred ‘outside the 
bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such 
                                                          
84 Prosecutor v Milosevic, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, IT-02-54-T, 16 June 2004, [63] (emphasis 
added). 
85 Art 49 (1) IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949. Also 
see analysis in n 79. 
86 Dinstein Y. (2009), The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (Cambridge, CUP) 161; Margalit A., Hibbin S. 
(2010), ‘Unlawful Presence of Protected Persons in Occupied Territory? An Analysis of Israel’s Permit Regime and 
Expulsions from the West Bank under the Law of Occupation’, YbIHumL, Vol. 13, 245, 256. 
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displacement’, nor can they be transferred to a country where they may fear persecution.87 Importantly, 
article 49 stipulates that those evacuated ‘shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities 
in the area in question have ceased’.88 It becomes clear from the differentiated terms chosen that 
forcible transfer and deportation are to be distinguished from evacuations which are intended as 
temporary measures for the safety of the population concerned.89 The temporary character of such 
evacuations is reinforced in article 58 API according to which the removal of civilians from military 
targets is subject to the obligations arising under article 49 IV GC. Finally, article 49 prohibits in 
absolute terms the occupying power from transferring its own population into the occupied territory. 
This obligation allows no exceptions or restrictions and hence no military necessity may justify such 
population transfer. This issue is further discussed below as it is relevant both for the right not to be 
displaced as well as the rights to return home and to property restitution examined in the next chapter.  
 
Such is the significance of article 49 that it ‘applies not only to mass deportations but to the deportation 
of individuals as well and that the prohibition was intended to be total, sweeping and unconditional’.90 
There is also consensus that the prohibitions entailed in article 49 have become binding through 
custom.91 
 
                                                          
87 See article 45 (4), n 85; n 55, 1405-06. 
88 n10, [1740]. 
89 n78, 280. 
90 See Justice Bach, Affo and Others, Judgment, 10 April 1988, High Court, Israel. 
91 Meron T. (1989), Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press) 48-9. 
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Both the terms ‘transfer’ and ‘deportation’ imply an intentional act, even though these may be carried 
out through positive and negative action.92 Importantly, article 49 prohibits forcible transfer and 
deportation from ‘occupied territory’.93 Occupation is established when a territory comes under the de 
facto authority of the enemy power94 and for as long as it exercises governmental functions, even if 
such functions are transferred to another authority, such as a puppet ‘state’.95 The stationing of troops, 
or mere presence is not sufficient to satisfy the element of occupation.96 In this respect article 49 does 
not seem to protect from forced displacement carried out before such occupation is established which 
can be very problematic as often the population is forced to abandon their homes and lands as a result 
of advancing enemy troops or shelling, attacks, bombardments and crimes committed elsewhere. This 
interpretation presents a significant legal gap concerning forced displacement which occurs outside 
the context of occupation highlighting why the recognition of a general right not to be displaced by 
armed conflict and serious human rights violations is imperative. In any event, whilst Section III of 
the Convention, to which article 49 falls, regulates the regime of occupation, article 2 IV GC ensures 
that the Convention – in its entirety - applies ‘from the outset of any conflict or occupation’. In this 
respect, ‘The relations between the civilian population of a territory and troops advancing into that 
territory, whether fighting or not, are governed by the present Convention. There is no intermediate 
                                                          
92 Such transfers can be deliberate or result from ‘malign neglect’: 1993 Preliminary Report of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities relating to Population Transfers; Al-Khasawneh/Hatano report, 
n9, [15]. 
93 n3, 210. 
94 n78, 273.  
95 Article 6, n85. Also see n81. 
96 Article 42, Hague Convention 1907, n28; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (2004) 136, 167, [78] (Wall Advisory Opinion); Case Concerning Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports (2005) 168, 
[172] (DRC v Uganda case). 
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period between what might be termed the invasion phase and the inauguration of a stable regime of 
occupation.’97 This aims to prevent any legal loopholes towards the protected persons and this must 
also be understood in the context of forced displacement. 
 
Another difficulty that article 49 presents is that it appears at first sight to be too narrow to encompass 
displacement which is forced not because of direct attacks98 but rather indirect coercive acts. For 
example, forced displacement may be caused through confiscation of land, deprivation of means of 
subsistence, or adverse economic conditions as is the situation resulting from Israel’s construction of 
the wall in the occupied Palestinian territory.99 It may also result from discriminatory measures100 and 
restrictions to rights such as freedom of movement which in turn have negative ramifications on access 
to healthcare or to schools such as in the case of enclaved Greek Cypriots who were forced to abandon 
their homes in the occupied by Turkey part of Cyprus.101 As article 49 was not intended to prohibit 
voluntary transfers102 the distinction between ‘forcible’ and ‘voluntary’ transfer becomes legally 
significant. Whilst voluntary transfer is restricted to situations which ‘might up to a certain point have 
the consent of those being transferred’, with specific reference to situations where ethnic or political 
minorities which have been subjected to discrimination or persecution may wish to leave the 
country,103 it is also clear that civilians are particularly vulnerable during conflict. This casts doubts as 
to whether denunciation of their rights protected under the IV GC, such as not to be displaced, can 
                                                          
97 n78, 59. 
98 n10, [1743]. 
99 Wall Advisory Opinion, n96, 191-92, [133]-[134]. 
100 Al-Khasawneh/Hatano report, n9, [37]. 
101 For violations against enclaved Greek Cypriots see Cyprus v Turkey (Application no. 25781/94), Judgments (Just 
Satisfaction) 12 May 2014. 
102 n78, 279; also see article 35, n85. 
103 Article 49, n78, 279. 
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result from genuinely free will.104 In clarifying what amounts to ‘forced’ displacement, the ICTFY in 
Stakic highlighted that this ‘is not to be limited to physical force but includes the threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse 
of power against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment.’105 As further pointed out by Jordan concerning Israel’s wall construction in occupied 
Palestinian territory,  
 
it is sufficient that the Occupying Power should adopt practices which are intended to drive 
the local inhabitants from their territory, or which may be reasonably foreseen to have that 
result.……a transfer will be ‘forcible’ if the measures adopted by the Occupying Power 
are such as in practice to leave the affected local population no realistic alternatives but to 
leave the territory. Even if such a movement of the local inhabitants is not the purpose 
behind the construction of the wall it is nevertheless a clear consequence, and Article 49 
makes it clear that transfers of the local population are prohibited ‘regardless of their 
motive’.106  
 
Nevertheless, ambiguity exists relating to those who flee due to a general fear related to armed conflict 
and mistrust towards the approaching army. In Gotovina for instance the ICTFY refused to find 
forcible displacement in that instance since there were no geographical or temporal links to the shelling 
                                                          
104 Article 8, n78, 75. 
105 Prosecutor v Stakić, IT-97-24-T, AC, Judgement, 22 March 2006, [281]; n10, [1738] and [1739]; n84, [63]. 
106 Written Statement submitted to the ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, 30 January 2004, [5.137]-[5.138]. 
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attacks that were carried out elsewhere.107 However, this finding is challenged since it is often the case 
that civilians are forced to abandon their homes even if they have not witnessed any violence 
themselves due to fear or information about atrocities taking place elsewhere. As pointed out by the 
ICTFY in an earlier decision, ‘A lack of genuine choice may be inferred from, inter alia, threatening 
and intimidating acts that are calculated to deprive the civilian population of exercising its free will, 
such as the shelling of civilian objects, the burning of civilian property, and the commission of – or 
the threat to commit – other crimes “calculated to terrify the population and make them flee the area 
with no hope of return.”’108 Moreover, in the subsequent case of Karadjic the Trial Chamber found 
that civilians were displaced as a result of fear caused by violence and other crimes committed against 
non-Serbs.109 Stavropoulou further argues that displacement in the context of general fear of violence 
may have been incorporated in article 17 APII concerning internal armed conflict (‘otherwise 
compelled’).110 Forced displacement in anticipation of a coercive environment is also recognised in 
the introduction of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.111 The issue is of legal 
significance as it relates to what constitutes forced displacement, irrespective of whether this occurs in 
occupied territory in which article 49 IV GC applies or not. 
 
Not only however forced displacement is prohibited under article 49 IV GC, but also the ‘unlawful 
deportation or transfer…. of a protected person’ constitutes a grave breach under article 147 IV GC, 
                                                          
107 N 10, [1762]; Eritrea – Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related 
Claims Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 & 26, 19 December 2005, [135], 
<https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/757> 
108 n84, [74]. 
109 Prosecutor v Karadjic, IT-95-5/18-T, 24 March 2016, [2468]. 
110 n5, 727. 
111 Kalin W. (2008), ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations’ (American Society of International Law 
and The Brookings Institution) 5; also see n27, 225; n6. 
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and hence a war crime giving rise to both individual criminal and state responsibility under articles 
146 and 148 from which states cannot be absolved.112 It is also a grave breach under article 85 (4) API 
GC applicable to inter-state conflicts.113 This article, which also prohibits as grave breach the transfer 
of the occupying power’s own population in the occupied territory, was adopted by consensus114 
demonstrating the fundamental character of the prohibition entailed herewith. Crucially however, it is 
today well-accepted that the provisions concerning grave breaches embodied in the Geneva 
Conventions constitute part of customary international law,115 and require states to prosecute, through 
legislation, individuals responsible for such breaches.116 As pointed out, ‘these rules are not simply 
“technical” rules but are “fundamental to the respect of the human person and [humanity]”’.117   
 
Furthermore, such is the importance of the interests protected under IHL that states cannot evade their 
obligations, especially when grave breaches are concerned. Sassoli notes in this regard that ‘a State 
cannot consent to a violation of the rules of IHL that protect victims’ rights’.118 Nor can the rights of 
protected persons be compromised or derogated from through the conclusion of special agreements 
                                                          
112 n78, 211; ‘Land and Human Rights: Standards and Applications’, UNOHCR, 2015, HR/PUB/15/5/Add.1, 88. 
113 n81. 
114 Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed 
Conflicts, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR. 44, 30 May 1977, 291. 
115 ICRC, Working paper on war crimes submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, 14 February 1997, [1 (a) (vi)] and [3 (xiii)]; Al-Khasawneh/Hatano report, n9, [172]. 
116 First report on crimes against humanity, Special Rapporteur Mr Sean D. Murphy, A/CN.4/680, 17 February 2015, [70]. 
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between the states parties to the conflict.119 Article 7 IV GC explicitly restricts this power. Hence, 
‘Article 7 is a landmark in the progressive renunciation by States of their sovereign rights in favour of 
the individual and of a higher juridical order.’120 This renders further support to the argument advanced 
in this chapter that a right not to be displaced by armed conflict exists in international law.  
 
At the same time, under the Geneva Conventions all its parties have an obligation to ensure compliance 
with them.121 This entitles member states to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state, or even, 
to make a claim on behalf of the beneficiaries in accordance with article 48 of the 2001 Final Articles 
on State Responsibility.122 With particular reference to IV GC, it has been stressed that the ‘correct 
application of the Convention is not a matter for the belligerents alone; it concerns the whole 
community of States and nations bound by the Convention’,123 hence confirming the erga omnes 
character of the provisions entailed in the Convention. Protected persons are further safeguarded as 
article 8 stipulates that the Convention protections are inviolable and cannot be renounced. Whilst 
respecting the free will of protected persons such as their right to leave the territory under article 35 
IV GC, article 8 aims to shield those concerned from state abuse.124 Article 8 in fact demonstrates the 
peremptory character of the protections afforded under the Convention. As a consequence of this, and 
                                                          
119 Article 7, n85. This provision would extend to the 1975 agreements between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
following the Turkish invasion which provided for population movement and relocation of the displaced. See Cyprus v 
Turkey (Application No 25781/94), Report of the European Commission on Human Rights, 4 June 1999, [246]. 
120 Commentary, n78, 70; n11, 414. 
121 Article 1, n85; also see Al-Khasawneh/Hatano report, n9, [114]; Wall Advisory Opinion, n96, [159]; also see n91, 48-
9. 
122 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, YbILC, 2001, vol. II, 
Part Two; n11, 419.   
123 Commentary, n78, 72. 
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in accordance with article 41 2001 Final Articles on State Responsibility states have an obligation not 
to render any aid or assistance to the state that commits serious violations of peremptory norms, not to 
recognise the unlawful act and to cooperate to bring the violation to an end.125 This also opens up the 
possibility of countermeasures by non-injured states.126 
 
The peremptory nature of the interests protected under the IV GC does not run counter to the temporary 
evacuations permitted under article 49, nor the assigned residence a protected person may be subjected 
to by the occupying power under article 78. Such restrictions are only allowed ‘for imperative reasons 
of security’. This flows from the Nuremburg trials which distinguished between evacuations ordered 
for protecting the populations and those carried out because of their military advantage. Whilst the 
former were accepted the latter were not.127 What constitutes military necessity is therefore important 
for the lawfulness of population removals.  
 
Article 47 IV GC is another important provision as it makes the rights of protected persons in occupied 
territory inviolable which cannot be compromised, ‘in any case or in any manner whatsoever’, by 
changes introduced as a result of the occupation, agreements between the occupying power and the 
authorities of the occupied territories, or by annexation of the territory concerned.128 The absolute 
nature with which this provision is stipulated provides further evidence of the fundamental nature of 
the protections entailed in the IV GC, including those relating to forcible transfer and deportation and 
                                                          
125 n122. 
126 For analysis see Katselli Proukaki E. (2010), The Problem of Enforcement in International Law: Countermeasures, the 
Non-Injured State and the Idea of International Community (Routledge). 
127 See in this regard List et al (Hostages trial) Ann Dig (1948) No 15, 632, 8 War Crimes Reports (1949) 34; Von Lewinski, 
Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases (1949) No 192, 509, 521 discussed in n3, 219. 
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the rights of civilians.129 This is because the drafters of the Convention aimed to prevent a wrongdoing 
party from benefiting from its wrongful acts, including through the conclusion of agreements which 
would concretise the illegality of the situation brought by its acts.  
 
Notably, states have a due diligence obligation to take all necessary measures to protect civilians from 
forced displacement whether this is carried out by state or non-state actors. During foreign occupation 
for instance, the occupying power has an obligation to exercise vigilance and to ensure respect of 
international human rights law and IHL by its own troops and other non-state actors. This position was 
confirmed by the ICJ which held Uganda responsible for failing to prevent ethnic conflict between the 
Hema and Lundu communities in the Ituri district in the DRC. According to the ICJ’s findings, 
Ugandan troops encouraged the taking of land from Lundu by Hema and failed to prevent the violence 
which led to the death of thousands of civilians and the displacement of 50,000 people.130 
 
The right not to be displaced may also be inferred from article 27 IV GC. This applies irrespective of 
whether occupation exists and provides that ‘protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to 
respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and 
their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected 
especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof.’  
 
In addition to these provisions individuals are also protected against displacement that occurs in 
internal armed conflict. Article 17 Additional Protocol II (APII) expressly prohibits the displacement 
of the population except where necessary for the safety of the population or for imperative military 
reasons. Article 17 further stipulates that civilians ‘shall not be compelled to leave their own territory 
                                                          
129 See analysis in Takkenberg L. (1998), The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law (Oxford, OUP) 220. 
130 DRC v Uganda case, n96, [179] and [209]. 
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for reasons connected with the conflict’,131 and it protects civilians from the acts of all parties engaged 
in the conflict, whether state or non-state actors.132 This provision was adopted by consensus.133 
Moreover, common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions stipulates the duty of ‘each Party’ to a non-
international conflict to treat all those persons not taking part in hostilities humanely without adverse 
discrimination on grounds of race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth or any other similar 
criteria. This provision is relevant as it may be argued that forced displacement does constitute 
treatment in violation of this obligation.134 In addition to these conventional rules the conduct of parties 
engaging in internal armed conflict is also regulated through customary law.135  
 
Furthermore, there is a growing body of state practice which condemns forced displacement as a war 
crime and a crime against humanity for which both individual and state responsibility may arise, 
reinforcing in this way the argument in support of the right not to be displaced.136 Of particular 
relevance for the purposes of this examination constitutes Chapter 38 of the Study of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC Study) on customary IHL concerning displacement.137 According 
to Rule 129 customary law prohibits parties to an international conflict to deport or to forcibly transfer 
the civilian population of an occupied territory, whilst parties to a non-international conflict may not 
                                                          
131 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of non-
international armed conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS (1979) 609. 
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order the displacement of the civilian population. In both cases, such conduct may only be allowed for 
the security of civilians or for imperative military reasons.138 The ICRC Study however has been 
criticised for failing to distinguish between different categories of displaced such as refugees and those 
internally displaced.139 More specifically, Greer argues that the ICRC Study should have taken into 
consideration the fact that refugees have stronger legal protection under IHRL, IHL and refugee law 
in comparison to IDPs. According to him, ‘By mixing duties to and rights of refugees with those of a 
less-protected legal status, the ICRC Study diluted the Rules pertaining to displaced persons.’140 
Nevertheless, the ICRC Rules do not aim to compromise rights already established under international 
law but rather to strengthen the protection concerning those who are forced to leave their home because 
of conflict, irrespective of whether they are crossing an international border or not. More importantly, 
it is because of this fragmented international legal protection that Greer refers to that the recognition 
of an autonomous right not to be displaced considered in this chapter becomes compelling. 
 
It becomes clear from the preceding analysis that IHL, and the Geneva law and its additional protocols 
particularly, prohibit forced displacement and that such prohibition aims to safeguard the individual 
right not to be displaced. Not only forced displacement is prohibited under this law, but violation of 
such international norms infringes fundamental interests of the international community as a whole.  
 
In parallel with those rules however which expressly prohibit forced displacement, individuals are also 
protected from other acts which force them to abandon their homes. This is examined next, although 
not exhaustively, with the focus on how property is protected under IHL, and on settlements 
established by occupying powers . 
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3.3 Protection of property and prohibition of population transfers in occupied territory 
 
Property provides a safe refuge without which people are exposed to serious violations of their 
fundamental rights. Its importance is recognised in the 1907 Hague Convention which protects both 
enemy property from being destroyed or seized unless necessitated by war (article 23) whilst 
safeguarding the rights of the nationals of the hostile party; and private property from confiscation as 
well as pillage during occupation. Such protection is not subject to restrictions (articles 46 and 47),141 
and it was in light of article 46 that the Nuremburg Tribunal in the Krupp case held that transactions 
based on discriminatory laws which affect private property rights are unlawful.142  
 
The protection of property is now also embodied in Geneva law. More specifically, article 33 IV GC 
prohibits the pillage of property as well as reprisals against the property of protected persons whether 
in occupied territory or in the territory of belligerent parties.143 This provision is a recognition of the 
serious impact that destruction of property bears for the victims,144 which in fact may lead them to 
displacement. Article 46 IV GC concerning aliens in the territory of a belligerent party provides that 
restrictive measures towards protected persons must end as soon as hostilities have ended, including 
those concerning property.145 Article 53 IV GC regulates the conduct of an occupying power in relation 
to property, whether private or belonging to the state, according to which such property is immune 
from destruction unless such destruction is ‘absolutely necessary’ for military operations. Such 
                                                          
141 Hague Convention 1907, n28. 
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143 See n21, 235, [126]. 
144 Commentary, n78, 226. 
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necessity was not found by the ICJ to exist in relation to Israel’s construction of the wall in the 
Palestinian occupied territories.146  Moreover, article 147 IV GC stipulates that extensive destruction 
and appropriation of property which is not justified by military necessity and which is carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly constitutes a grave breach subject to universal jurisdiction.147 This is also 
recognised in Rules 50 and 51 ICRC Study as well as under customary international law. Rule 52 
further provides that pillage is prohibited in both inter-state and internal conflict. Moreover, the 
prohibition of arbitrary or illegal seizure of property not justified by war necessities constitutes a 
general principle of law,148 violation of which may constitute a war crime.149 Rule 133 further 
stipulates that the property rights of the displaced must be respected although it does not articulate who 
is burdened with such duty.  
 
The Statute of the ICTFY (ICTFY Statute) itself in article 2 prohibits extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly 
as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, article 3 prohibits as a war crime the 
plunder of public or private property including unlawful and intentional appropriation not justified by 
military necessity, especially when this is carried out on discriminatory grounds. The aim of this 
provision is to protect fundamental values whose violation has grave consequences for the victim, 
particularly if the violation is widespread.150 A similar prohibition is embodied in article 8 Rome 
Statute, which also prohibits as war crimes attacks directed against civilians and their property. 
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The ICJ on its part has found that Uganda’s looting and bombing of Congolese property in the Ituri 
region was in breach of both IHL and IHRL,151 although disappointingly the ICJ did not specifically 
address the issue of forced displacement which was caused because of the conflict in DRC. Whilst 
pillage and the destruction and appropriation of property during conflict are violations themselves, it 
is quite clear that such acts are often used with intent to force civilians out of their homes, or they 
indirectly lead to forced displacement. Prohibition of such acts provides further evidence in support of 
the existence of the right not to be displaced, as well as the rights to return home and to property 
restitution discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Alongside these prohibitions, article 49 IV GC prohibits an occupying power from transferring its own 
population into occupied territory. Such transfers aim to alter the demography and legal status of 
occupied territory by concretising control over it and by creating an intended humanitarian crisis 
causing instability and animosity among the competing populations.152 International law stands firm 
in this regard and no attempt which deviates from this clear prohibition should be accepted through for 
instance peace agreements. The significance of this prohibition is also illustrated in the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) judgment in Loizidou. The case concerned an individual complaint against 
Turkey  as occupying power for preventing the applicant from peacefully enjoying her property as 
safeguarded under article 1 Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Although the ECtHR was not called to examine Turkey’s actions in light of IHL, the ECtHR  refused 
to accept that the need to rehouse displaced Turkish Cypriots satisfied the requirement of necessity for 
lawfully interfering with the applicant’s right.153 Such finding however is to be contrasted with the 
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subsequent disappointing, and arguably flawed,154 judgment in Demopoulos where the ECtHR in effect 
accepted the realities created because of the Turkish occupation at the expense of the property and 
other fundamental rights of those forcibly displaced.155 This brings Demopoulos at variance with both 
IHRL and IHL.156 To this effect, the rights of the displaced must take prevalence over potentially 
competing human rights claims,157 whilst the wrongdoing state must bear responsibility for undoing 
the illegality it has brought about. 
 
As pointed out, ‘these [population transfer and demographic manipulation] practices make more 
difficult the process of reaching a constructive outcome. The practices involved should be recognized 
as having a character of their own and deserving a clearer profile as a wrong to international public 
order.’158 Indeed, such a serious violation constitutes a war crime and a grave breach as set out in 
article 85 (4) (a) AP I and it is accepted as a prohibition embedded in customary law.159 It is also 
prohibited under article 8 (2) (b) (viii) of the Rome Statute. Such transfers in occupied territory have 
been described as having no legal validity by the Security Council,160 and breach international law.161  
                                                          
154 See Tzevelekos, Chapter 3 and Meleagrou and Paraskeva, Chapter 4 of this Volume. 
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The transfer of settlers is also prohibited under Rule 130 of the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law. Such prohibition also reinforces both the right not to be displaced and the rights to 
return home and to property restitution as it prevents states from benefiting from the fruits of their own 
unlawful conduct. 
 
3.4 Concluding remarks on the right not to be displaced 
 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that forced displacement constitutes a serious violation of IHL. 
Under this law the removal of the population from their homes and lands can only be justified as a 
temporary measure in exceptional circumstances necessitated by the conflict or the safety of the 
population. At the same time, it becomes clear that expulsion can never be used as a form of 
punishment or in retaliation of other wrongful acts.162 As pointed out, ‘A mass expulsion is a Draconian 
conception that has absolutely no place in the modern world.’163 Importantly, ‘Displacement of persons 
carried out pursuant to an agreement among political or military leaders, or under the auspices of the 
ICRC or another neutral organization, does not necessarily make it voluntary.’164 The preceding 
analysis also demonstrates that civilians are often induced to flee as a result of unlawful destruction or 
appropriation of property, or settlements.  
 
One of the main questions however relevant to this examination is whether individuals are afforded 
rights which they can invoke either at national or international level. This is a question of predominant 
significance for the protection against forced displacement in light of the state-centric character of 
international law according to which international norms create obligations and rights towards and/or 
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between states. This position was in effect reflected in the Panevezys Saldutiskis Railway Case 
(Estonia v Lithuania) in which the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) affirmed that by 
bringing an international claim on behalf of its nationals, the state was in reality asserting its own right 
to ensure the compliance of another state with international rules.165 However, international law has 
evolved to recognise that an international treaty between states may in fact confer rights upon 
individuals. This is the position taken in LaGrand where the rights of the individuals which in that 
instance emanated from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,166 co-existed with the rights of 
the state emanating from that same treaty. Indeed, the fact that international rules, whether embodied 
in treaties or in customary rules may award rights to individuals is now a well-established position, 
particularly in IHRL.167 This extends to IHL which, going beyond imposing certain obligations upon 
states or parties to the conflict on what their conduct should be during armed conflict, is intended to 
protect individuals, even if by doing so the state also protects its own interests and rights. At the end 
of the day, similarly with IHRL, norms under this legal regime aim to alleviate the pain and suffering 
of individuals, whether wounded enemy combatants or civilians. The perception that IHL regulates 
the conduct between states168 and that it cannot be relied upon by individuals neglects the significant 
transformation of contemporary international legal thinking whereby individuals are proper subjects 
with international rights and obligations.169 International humanitarian law should therefore be 
understood as not only setting out obligations upon states but also as affording rights to those it aims 
                                                          
165 Panevezys Saldutiskis Railway Case (Estonia v Lithuania), PCIJ (1939) Series AB, Judgment, 28 February 1939, 4, 16. 
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to protect,170 otherwise the significance of the protections entailed under this body of law would be 
devoid of any meaning. To ensure the effective protection of the individual as intended under IHL it 
is necessary to interpret the rights embodied in that field of law broadly, whilst any exceptions or 
restrictions must be narrowly construed.171 Moreover, the increasing significance of individuals 
advocates an interpretation of IHL in compliance with fundamental human rights standards.172 As 
Zegveld points out, the concept of ‘rights’ is not unknown in the Geneva Conventions themselves,173 
and in any event, it is essential that treaties which protect fundamental community interests are 
interpreted as ‘living instruments’ which are subject to evolution for the effective protection of those 
which they were set up to protect in the first place.174 Importantly, and as the Commentary to article 8 
IV GC reveals, ‘it is the first time that a set of international regulations has been devoted not to State 
interests, but solely to the protection of the individual.’175   
 
The preceding analysis makes clear that IHL supports the existence of an individual right not to be 
displaced by armed conflict. Nevertheless, it also becomes clear that the fact that different legal rules 
and regimes apply depending on whether displacement is carried out in inter-state or internal armed 
conflict or during occupation undermine clarity and legal certainty and weaken the protection afforded 
to individuals. The recognition of an independent right not to be displaced, as advanced in this chapter, 
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aims to fill these gaps and to protect the individual from forced displacement in a more unitary and 
integral manner. The next section turns to ICL and whether, and if so how, the individual is protected 
against forced displacement. 
  
4 The Legal Basis of the Right not to be Displaced under International Criminal Law  
 
The trials that followed the end of WWII exercised significant influence on the development of ICL 
as a tool which imposes individual criminal responsibility for violations of IHL and widespread or 
systematic serious human rights abuses such as forced displacement. Indeed, following WWII 
deportation of individuals who shared the same nationality as the perpetrators was punished as a crime 
against humanity. Today, this concept evolved to encapsulate grave violations of international law 
committed in war or in peacetime which affect not only the victims themselves but also mankind.176 
At the same time, ICL has significantly influenced the development of the right not to be displaced as 
explained below. 
 
In recent legal developments, forced displacement is prohibited as a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions under article 2 (g) of the ICTFY Statute and as a crime against humanity under article 5 
(d),177 although the content of the offence remains the same in each instance.178 Article 5 does not 
make a distinction between internal or inter-state armed conflict,179 and punishes forced displacement 
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that occurs through expulsion or other coercive means.180 If carried out on discriminatory grounds it 
is punished as persecution and hence, a crime against humanity in violation of article 5 (h). As the 
ICTFY jurisprudence reveals, for forcible transfer and deportation to be established as crimes against 
humanity it is not necessary to establish actual control or occupation over the territory under 
consideration.181 This is consistent with article I (b) of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity according to which ‘eviction by 
armed attack or occupation’ is a crime against humanity.182 Moreover, displacement may be the result 
of severe living conditions which force civilians to move.183 These may include dismissal from 
employment, house searches, and the cutting off of water or electricity supply.184 Forced displacement 
as a crime against humanity can also take the form of preventing return which is often achieved through 
discriminatory legislative restrictions to reclaiming abandoned property.185 Furthermore, whilst the 
ICTFY has accepted that evacuation may be permitted in exceptional circumstances, it has refused to 
relieve an individual from international criminal responsibility when the displacement carried out for 
humanitarian reasons was the result of the unlawful activity of the accused.186 Hence, it becomes clear 
that forcible displacement is significantly restricted, with the ICTFY jurisprudence illuminating the 
situations in which it was given effect without grounds under international law.   
 
                                                          
180 Ibid, [488]. 
181 n10, [1750]. 
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In its recent judgment in the Karadzic case, the Trial Chamber found that the accused took part in a 
joint criminal enterprise to forcibly remove Bosnian non-Serbs (Croats and Muslims) from the territory 
claimed by Bosnian Serb forces in the Municipalities in violation of article 5 ICTFY Statute. 
Significantly however the Trial Chamber found Karadzic guilty for participating in a joint criminal 
enterprise the aim of which was to ‘eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica’ first by forcibly 
removing the women, children and the elderly and then by killing the men and boys.187 According to 
the Trial Chamber, the circumstances of the forcible removal were such as to demonstrate intent to 
inflict serious physical and mental suffering and amounted to persecution,188 and it was satisfied that 
the killings demonstrated intent to destroy the Muslims of Srebrenica, and hence genocide.189 This is 
a landmark judgment which, together with Tolimir, showcases that forced displacement may, in certain 
circumstances, lead to very serious human rights violations such as genocide. 
 
Similar to article 5 ICTFY Statute, article 3 (d) of the 1994 Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR Statute) prohibits systematic or widespread deportation on national, 
ethnic, religious or political grounds as a crime against humanity. However, the ICTFY and ICTR 
Statutes do not distinguish between lawful and unlawful displacement although the ICTFY has 
accepted that forced displacement must be caused without grounds permitted under international 
law.190 This was interpreted as meaning that protection from forced displacement is extended 
irrespective of whether an individual satisfies the legal requirements of residence or immigration so as 
to protect ‘those who have, for whatever reason, come to “live” in the community – whether long term 
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or temporarily’, including IDPs who have established temporary homes elsewhere. The only exception 
from such protection relates to those who occupy houses or premises unlawfully or illegally.191  
 
Controversy however has been sparked concerning what amounts as unlawful conduct forcing 
displacement. In Gotovina for instance forced displacement was linked to the unlawfulness of the 
attack192 holding that artillery attacks carried out within a range of 200 metres from a military objective 
were lawful attacks whereas attacks beyond this distance were indiscriminate and hence unlawful.193 
On this basis the Trial Chamber found the two accused liable for participating in a joint criminal 
enterprise whose purpose was to permanently remove the Serbs of Krajina by force or threat of force.194 
This standard was  subsequently rejected by the Appeals Chamber in its much criticised acquittal 
judgment195 without however providing guidance with which a distinction between lawful and 
unlawful attacks could be made. As Clark points out, in reality the Trial Chamber had taken into 
consideration the fear caused by the shelling as a factor that forced people to leave. As a consequence, 
‘It is not the case…as the judgement of the Appeals Chamber incorrectly asserts, that the Trial 
Chamber “considered unlawful attacks the core indicator that the crime of deportation had 
occurred”.’196 To this effect, the Appeal Chamber’s over-reliance on the 200-metre standard as an error 
made by the Trial Chamber was not justified as it overlooked other significant evidence in support of 
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a finding of forced displacement involving the accused’s responsibility.197 The significance of the 
Appeal Chamber’s judgment lies on the fact that the forced removal of approximately 200,000 ethnic 
Serbs from Krajina, few of whom have been able to return home,198 remains unchallenged.  
 
Unlawful deportation or transfer committed in international armed conflict and displacement not 
justified by the need to protect civilians or imperative military reasons in internal armed conflict are 
prohibited under article 8 of the Rome Statute as war crimes. Forced displacement without grounds 
permitted under international law is also prohibited as a crime against humanity under article 7 Rome 
Statute.199 Article 7 encompasses coercive measures such as death threats, destruction of property, or 
obstacles in accessing employment or education200 if carried out on a widespread and systematic basis 
with knowledge of the attack, whilst it may also encompass violations committed by non-state 
actors.201 According to the Elements of Crime, ‘The term “forcibly” is not restricted to physical force, 
but may include threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or another person, or by 
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taking advantage of a coercive environment.’202 Article 7 also prohibits persecution, namely the 
‘intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law’ on racial, 
ethnic, political, national, cultural or religious grounds which is often the case in forced 
displacement.203 Distinguishing between grounds permitted under international law and those which 
are not becomes significant also in this context. For instance, Bassiouni argues that deportations or 
transfers that arise from a treaty concerning territorial changes fall outside the protection scope of 
article 7 Rome Statute.204 However, as already argued in Section 2, forced displacement, either carried 
out during war or in light of peace agreements or territorial arrangements continues to be a serious 
violation of international law. In fact, it is not clear why an international agreement would render 
forced displacement as lawful, particularly when such displacement is premised on violation of other 
rules of international law such as the law prohibiting armed force, or violation of fundamental human 
rights, including prohibition from discrimination and the right not to be displaced. Any restriction of 
rights, whether safeguarded under IHRL or IHL, needs to be justified as necessary and proportionate 
and as fulfilling a legitimate aim. In this author’s view, the forcible uprooting of people especially 
when carried out on discriminatory grounds can never be justified as pursuing a legitimate aim.    
 
Finally, forced displacement ‘by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are 
lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law’ is recognised as a crime against 
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humanity under article 3 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity,205 as well as under 
article 18 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.206 ‘Eviction by armed 
attack or occupation’ is also recognised as a crime against humanity in the 1968 Convention on the 
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity whilst states 
parties are called to criminalise such acts domestically and to remove any statutory provisions which 
prevent prosecution of such crimes.207 Finally, it is a crime against humanity under international 
customary law either when committed in an inter-state or an internal armed conflict.208 Fundamentally, 
forced displacement violates obligations erga omnes209 whose prohibition falls within the body of 
peremptory norms of international law.210 To this effect, in addition to the obligation not to force 
people out of their homes, states have a well-established duty to prevent crimes against humanity211 
whether these occur within or outside their territory.212 
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The prohibition of forced displacement as an international crime, whether committed during war or as 
part of widespread or systematic manner, as established here is further evidence in support of the right 
not to be displaced under these circumstances. The next section turns to the question of whether 
international human rights law renders further support on the existence of such right. 
 
5 The Legal Basis of the Right not to be Displaced under International Human Rights Law 
 
Forced displacement does not only constitute a violation of IHL and ICL, but it is first and foremost a 
human rights issue. As pointed out,  
 
The fundamental premise is that the displacement of a person from his place of residence 
and his forcible assignment to another place seriously harms his dignity, his liberty and his 
property. A person’s home is not merely a roof over his head, but it is also a means for the 
physical and social location of a person, his private life and his social relationships … 
Several basic human rights are harmed as a result of an involuntary displacement ….. even 
if this assigned residence does not involve him crossing an international border.213 
 
Similarly, the ICTFY highlighted that  
 
The prohibition against forcible displacements aims at safeguarding the right and 
aspiration of individuals to live in their communities and homes without outside 
interference.214  
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Truly, forced displacement exposes the displaced population to serious threats to life and to physical 
and psychological integrity,215 significantly interfering with the right not to be subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to family and private life including the right to 
respect one’s home, to peaceful enjoyment of possessions as well as freedom of movement and 
settlement in one’s own country. These are protected in various human rights treaties including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).216 In Loizidou for example the ECtHR refused to accept that the irreversible 
expropriation of property and the complete negation of the applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of 
her possessions as safeguarded under article 1 ECHR Protocol 1 and which resulted from the Turkish 
occupation of Cyprus could be justified under necessity.217 Importantly, the European Commission on 
Human Rights had early on affirmed that population movements carried out in the context of 
humanitarian efforts are not sufficient to remove the forcible, and hence unlawful nature of such 
movements. As noted, ‘Even those who leave the northern area under the humanitarian transfer 
arrangements are left no other choice than unconditionally abandoning their homes, there being no 
possibility for a reconsideration of their cases if they should eventually wish to return.’218 
 
Of particular relevance for the purposes of this examination is article 12 ICCPR which provides that 
‘Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty 
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of movement and freedom to choose his residence’ and that ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
the right to enter his own country.’ Whilst this provision does not expressly provide for the right not 
to be displaced, the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the ICCPR’s monitoring body, interpreted the 
right to choose one’s residence as including ‘protection against all forms of forced internal 
displacement.’219 Moreover, ‘the right of a person to enter his or her own country recognizes the special 
relationship of a person to that country. The right has various facets. It implies the right to remain in 
one’s own country.’220 Notably, so significant is the right not to be displaced that the HRC, in 
considering the scope of article 4 ICCPR in relation to derogations in times of public emergency 
pointed out that acts amounting to crimes against humanity cannot provide justification for such 
derogations. As pointed out, ‘deportation or forcible transfer of population without grounds permitted 
under international law, in the form of forced displacement by expulsion or other coercive means from 
the area in which the persons concerned are lawfully present, constitutes a crime against humanity.’221 
Accordingly, a state party cannot derogate its obligations under article 12 ICCPR safeguarding 
freedom of movement if the restrictions imposed are the result of the commission of a crime against 
humanity.  
 
Whilst freedom of movement in the context of forced displacement is explored in detail in the 
following chapter, it is worth pointing out the close connection between the right not to be displaced 
and respect of freedom of movement. This was recognised by the African Commission on Human and 
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People’s Rights according to which states have a duty to adopt measures to prevent displacement.222 
At the same time, the ICJ, in its Advisory Opinion in the Wall Case concluded that destruction or 
confiscation of property, restrictions on freedom of movement and other rights which resulted from 
the construction of the wall were not proportionate, nor the least intrusive, and hence they were 
unlawful.223 
   
Moreover, forced displacement deprives its victims of essential means for their survival including 
housing, employment, education and healthcare which are safeguarded under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).224 It also violates people’s right to self-
determination including through denial of disposing of their natural resources225 and has detrimental 
consequences on communities with special attachment to their land for their cultural development.226 
Forced displacement is also often based on discrimination which is a breach of international law. For 
example, article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination outlaws ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin’ intended to interfere with equal access to ‘the political, economic, 
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social, cultural or any other field of public life’, including the right to own property and to housing.227 
The Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid is also relevant here as 
it prohibits legislative and other measures intended to deny members of a targeted group of their right 
to leave and return to their country, and their freedom of movement, as well as the expropriation of 
property along racial lines.228 Relatedly, so significant is the prohibition of apartheid that it is well-
established as a peremptory norm of international law giving rise to obligations erga omnes. 
 
As Verdross pointed out it is clear that  
 
les individus ne sont plus des simples objets des Etats, mais des personnes qui ont des 
droits propres qui doivent être reconnus et protégés par les Etats. De cela découle que les 
Etats ne peuvent plus disposer d’eux comme du bétail: Un transfert de populations contre 
la volontue des individus intéresés me semble donc exclu.229  
 
This analysis, albeit non- exhaustive, shows that the right not to be displaced against one’s will 
emanates from several legally binding human rights provisions.230  At the same time, and as the 
next section establishes, the right not to be displaced has its own independent standing as part of 
customary law.  
 
                                                          
227 Articles 1 and 5, Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 
195. 
228 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1015 UNTS, I 14861. 
229 Verdross A. quoted in n3, 225. 
230 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission 
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6 The Right not to be Displaced by Armed Conflict as Part of Customary International 
Law 
 
This section will show that not only forced displacement is prohibited, but also that there is a 
corresponding individual right not to be displaced under international customary law. To achieve this 
the analysis will focus on evidence from state practice and opinio juris by reliance on a variety of 
sources. These include legally binding and ‘soft’ law instruments, the jurisprudence and the literature 
all of which establish the existence of general, continuous, repetitive and consistent practice as well as 
legal belief that such right is the law.231  
 
To begin with, the prohibition and the need to end systematic displacement of civilians during armed 
conflict have been the focus of the 2000 Cairo Declaration, in which African and EU states 
participated,232 and of the 1992 Declaration on Humanitarian Assistance and Gradual Repatriation of 
Temporary Refugees and Displaced Persons from the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in 
Croatia.233 The right not to be forcibly removed from their lands or territories is also recognised in 
article 10 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People.  As the provision stipulates, any 
relocation requires the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous people, just and fair 
                                                          
231 On analysis of each of these requirements see Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru), ICJ Reports (1950) 266; North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark and The Netherlands), ICJ Reports (1969) 3; Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports (1986) 
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compensation and the option of return where possible.234 The forced removal of people from the lands 
they occupy is also prohibited under article 16 of 1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention.235  
 
Significantly, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement stipulate that ‘All authorities and 
international actors shall respect and ensure respect for their obligations under international law, 
including human rights and humanitarian law, in all circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid 
conditions that might lead to displacement of persons.’236 Principle 6 is of compelling significance as 
it stipulates the right of every human being to be protected from arbitrary displacement from their 
home or place of habitual residence, including displacement that results from discriminatory practices 
and ethnic cleaning which aim to alter the ethnic, religious or racial composition of the affected 
population, and when used as collective punishment. Principle 7 further stipulates that displacement 
should be a means of last resort and that all other alternative means should be explored ‘in order to 
avoid displacement altogether.’237 Although the Guiding Principles are not legally binding, they 
‘reflect and are consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law and analogous refugee 
law’.238 Such is the influence and impact of the Guiding Principles that they were incorporated into 
the Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons adopted by the 
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, an inter-governmental organisation consisting of 
12 African states.239 This provides an excellent example of state practice and opinio juris in support of 
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the principles entailed therein, including the right not to be displaced. The Protocol commits states 
parties to prevent and eliminate root causes of arbitrary displacement through prevention. In article 4 
member states undertake to adhere to the general principles of IHL and IHRL and to the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement concerning the rights of IDPs. The Protocol provides a legal 
platform whereby a non-legally binding instrument, in this instance the Guiding Principles, are given 
legal effect through a binding agreement.240 The Guiding Principles have also inspired the conclusion 
of the Kampala Convention, the first legally binding instrument on internal displacement, which 
imposes an obligation on states parties to prevent and put an end to arbitrary displacement caused by 
both state and non-state actors. Article 3 (1) (a) provides that states parties shall ‘[r]efrain from, 
prohibit and prevent arbitrary displacement of populations’.241 Article 4 sets out the obligation of states 
parties to punish under domestic law arbitrary displacement which is tantamount to genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. It also provides a non-exhaustive list of situations which are 
tantamount to arbitrary displacement including displacement not justified for the security of civilians 
or military necessity or when used as a method of war or as a result of other violations of IHL. It further 
includes displacement that results from racial discrimination or other similar practices aimed at altering 
the ethnic, religious or racial composition of the population.242 The Kampala Convention is a landmark 
step in recognition of the right not to be displaced and provides further evidence of the impact and 
influence of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
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In support of the right not to be displaced is article 8 (1) of the Protocol for the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of 
Discrimination, according to which ‘The Member States recognise that the crime of genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity are crimes under international law and are crimes against people’s 
rights which they undertake to prevent and punish.’243  
 
Moreover and as pointed out, ‘the right to return derives from the illegality of the expulsion itself. It 
is generally recognised that a state cannot legally expel a population under its control. Those expelled 
clearly have the right to reverse an illegal act, that is, to return to their homeland.’244 The right to return 
as well as the right to restitution examined in the next chapter count in support of the existence of a 
right not to be displaced: truly, why would one need these rights if they did not have a right not to be 
displaced in the first place? Moreover, there exist numerous legally and non-legally binding 
instruments which protect an individual’s right to have access to land, either as tenant or as owner,245 
and which complement state practice and opinio juris in support of the right not to be displaced.  
 
The right not to be displaced has also found expression in numerous UN General Assembly resolutions. 
For instance, the General Assembly has affirmed that ‘civilian populations, or individual members 
                                                          
243 Emphasis added. The Protocol was adopted by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region as part of the 
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thereof, should not be the object of … forcible transfers’246 and that the destruction of dwellings and 
forcible eviction carried out by belligerents during military operations or in occupied territory shall be 
considered criminal.247 The General Assembly has also deplored the ‘evacuation, deportation, 
expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories and denial of their 
right to return’.248 The UN Security Council has itself affirmed in numerous resolutions the right not 
to be forcibly displaced. For instance, in resolution 752 concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina it called 
‘all parties and others concerned to ensure that forcible expulsions of persons from the areas where 
they live and any attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population, anywhere in the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cease immediately’.249 Although this resolution was not 
adopted under Chapter VII UN Charter, it provides evidence of state practice and opinio juris in 
support of the right not to be displaced. In resolution 1009, adopted under Chapter VII,  the Security 
Council demanded from Croatia to ‘respect fully the rights of the local Serb population, including their 
rights to remain, leave or return in safety’.250 A similar Chapter VII demand for cessation of forced 
evacuations carried out in Srebrenica was made in resolution 819.251 By reference to the worsening 
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situation in the former Yugoslavia the Security Council condemned the unlawful deportation of 
civilians as a ‘grave violation of international humanitarian law’.252  
 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared civilian expulsion as a crime against 
humanity,253 and deplored ethnic cleansing and civilian deportations from the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia.254 Such displacement was also condemned by EU observers,255 but also by several states 
as inhuman and a grave breach of IV GC.256 It must be said however that this run counter to Western 
efforts to bring internal territorial partition, causing more displacement, as the only perceived way to 
end the conflict in the country.257 Nevertheless, many national military manuals and domestic laws 
prohibit civilian deportation and forcible transfer as a war crime and a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions, with some emphasizing that this is so irrespective of the motive.258 Furthermore, forced 
displacement as a result of occupation has been condemned by the International Conference of the Red 
Cross259 and by the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Supreme Council.260 The right not to be displaced was 
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further affirmed by the Human Rights Council where it called for upholding IHL and IHRL obligations 
in order to prevent forced displacement.261 Moreover, according to a 1997 report of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer, including the Implantation of 
Settlers and Settlements, the non-consensual displacement through transfers and implantations 
constitute human rights violations prohibited under international law.262 The prohibition of arbitrary 
displacement was reaffirmed recently by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally 
Displaced Persons.263  
 
The prohibition of civilian displacement unless necessary for their security or imperative military 
reasons has been embodied in several agreements such as the Agreement on the Application and 
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,264 and in article 2 (15) and 3 (7) of the Comprehensive Agreement between the Republic 
of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines.265 The 1993 Cotonou 
Agreement on Liberia obliges the parties to the conflict to end and prevent further displacement of the 
population and to facilitate the return of those displaced.266 Furthermore, Article 6 of the Statute of the 
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Extra-ordinary African Chambers267 stipulates that deportation is a crime against humanity whilst 
article 7 stipulates that unlawful deportation or transfer is a war crime.  
 
It can therefore be concluded from the preceding analysis, which is by no means exhaustive, that the 
forced displacement of the civilian population either across or within national borders in armed conflict 
and as a result of serious human rights violations is prohibited under international law. Importantly, 
the analysis demonstrates that so deplorable is the practice of forced displacement when not justified 
under international law, that individuals are protected not only after displacement has taken place but 
also before such displacement occurs. To this effect, both state practice and opinio juris and specific 
treaty law support the existence of the right not to be displaced by armed conflict and serious human 
rights violations. 
 
7 Individual Rights and Remedies under International Law  
 
The preceding analysis established that forced displacement is prohibited under international law and 
that individuals have the right not to be displaced. Nevertheless, the fact that individuals possess 
international rights, whether under human rights or humanitarian law, is markedly distinct from the 
existence of remedies which will enable the injured individuals (victims)268 to exercise as well as to 
give effect to such rights. It is therefore not sufficient that states possess obligations which give rise to 
specific individual rights, since these must also be accompanied by remedies, a position that was also 
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stipulated during the Diplomatic Conference that was held in 1949.269 Despite this, international 
humanitarian law is particularly marked by the fact that there may be a right which is however not 
matched by individual remedy.270 For instance, according to the Commentary to article 29 IV GC, the 
Convention does not empower individuals with a right to claim compensation as the Convention sets 
out a state to state mechanism.271 Despite this, the commentary to IV GC leaves the door open to 
individuals bringing a claim against their state of origin for any violations they may have suffered as 
a result of agreements concluded with the belligerent state, ‘in those countries at least in which 
individual rights may be maintained before the Courts’.272 Importantly however, the Convention 
enables protected persons ‘to employ any procedure available, however rudimentary, to demand 
respect for the Convention's terms.’273 Article 30 IV GC for instance provides that protected persons 
‘shall have every facility for making an application to Protecting Powers’ absence of which would 
render any protection afforded under the Convention devoid of meaning.274 Moreover, it has been 
argued that article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention extends the right to compensation to individuals 
and not merely states, whilst article 91 API also provides for compensation for violations of the Geneva 
Conventions.275 At the same time, the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparations for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, albeit 
not legally binding276 provide for the right to a remedy through ‘equal and effective access to justice’, 
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‘adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered’ and reparation including restitution, 
compensation and satisfaction.277 
 
Equally problematic in international law is the absence of international judicial or other enforcement 
mechanisms where the victims of international humanitarian law violations can claim their rights.278 
The legal gap that this presents is particularly noticeable in situations of serious violations committed 
on a widespread scale, such as forced displacement. Nevertheless, individuals have increasingly been 
able to seek some remedy for such violations through international human rights judicial and other 
monitoring bodies such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the HRC, the African Court on 
Human and Peoples Rights and the ECtHR but only to the extent that such violations breach one of 
the rights entailed in their respective treaties.279 This is because jurisdictional considerations restrict 
the ability of such bodies to implement international humanitarian law directly. Moreover, even where 
the individual can rely on other legal regimes for wrongdoing they suffered as a result of international 
humanitarian law violations, this provides an indirect way for the affected individual to obtain a 
remedy for a violation that has already occurred. This also means that victims of violations can only 
seek such remedy if the state concerned is a party to that treaty. In addition to this, international bodies, 
such as the ECtHR are sometimes unwilling, as the decision in Demopoulos reveals,280 or even unable 
to deal with massive human rights violations. Nevertheless, the significance of this, albeit limited and 
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indirect, access to protection for international humanitarian law violations, should not be 
underestimated.281 To this effect it has been noted that ‘Whereas the applicability of humanitarian law 
will end with the cessation of hostilities, human rights obligations remain applicable in peacetime.’282 
The significance of this lies in the fact that IHRL may offer protection for continuing effects of armed 
conflict such as is the case with forced displacement, and particularly the right not to be displaced, to 
return and to property restitution examined in the next chapter. Moreover, ‘seeking reparation for 
violations of human rights might be easier than for violations of international humanitarian law’283 
particularly in relation to identifying the bearer of the obligation. This is because IHL violations may 
be committed by non-state actors or foreign states.  As pointed out in this regard, 
 
it may be impossible to obtain redress and seeking compensation may be complicated by 
issues of jurisdiction and the general settlement of claims in peace agreements between 
States. Proving a violation of international humanitarian law may also be more difficult 
than proving a violation of human rights law….. On the other hand, the non-fulfilment of 
a human right is fairly straightforward, easily observable and thus easier to prove.284   
 
At the same time, access to international mechanisms needs to be distinguished from domestic 
remedies which may be available to victims of IHL violations, although in situations of forced 
displacement by another state, victims may encounter significant difficulties in claiming their rights 
particularly in relation to their right not to be displaced or to return home. Indeed, access to domestic 
                                                          
281 Greenwood C. (2000), ‘International humanitarian law’ in Kalshoven F. (ed), The Centennial of the First International 
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remedies very much depends on whether the domestic legal system in question allows individuals to 
rely on rights conferred upon them through international rules, customary or conventional. Domestic 
courts have been generally reluctant to allow individual claims for violations occurring during armed 
conflict, as evident from Japanese courts’ rejection of individuals claims brought in relation to sexual 
slavery of women during WWII.285 Opening the door to millions of individuals whose rights have been 
violated during armed conflict presents a significant challenge that domestic courts are not always 
prepared to deal with.286 This is despite the fact that Principle 2 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law requires states to take necessary domestic measures to prevent violations and to 
provide victims with effective access to justice and remedies.287  
 
There is no doubt that effectively exercising the right not to be displaced by armed conflict and 
claiming a remedy for its violation remains distant from reality. It is however for this reason that the 
recognition of a right not to be displaced by armed conflict as advanced in this chapter becomes 
significant as it will enable the development of mechanisms to ensure the effective protection of the 
individual. Without the existence of a right there can be no violation, and without a violation there can 
be no remedy. At the same time, the reverse is true: ‘to assert that a person has a right is to say that he 
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possesses ways and means of having that right respected, and that any violation thereof entails a 
penalty.’288 
 
These goals will arguably be better achieved through the adoption of an international convention on 
forced displacement caused by armed conflict and serious human rights violations. In fact, it is 
submitted that the time has ripened for the adoption of such a convention, without prejudicing other 
circumstances of forced displacement which however, as explained earlier, do not fall within the scope 
of the present discussion. Whilst such a convention would not eliminate the problem of forced 
displacement, it would strengthen the existing legal framework.289 The Kampala Convention shows 
the way for a cross-continent agreement which will prohibit and prevent forced displacement and 
safeguard the rights of the victims of such violations. Such convention would need to provide clarity 
regarding the rights of individuals concerning displacement and establish appropriate remedies in case 
of violation of the right not to be forcibly removed from one’s home and land. Such a convention 
would need to strengthen the regime of legal protection rather than compromise already existing legal 
standards regarding forced displacement.290 This is not the first time that a call for codification of the 
rules concerning forced displacement. More specifically, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights 
called in 1993 for an instrument that would ‘provide for an express reaffirmation of the unlawfulness 
of population transfer and the implantation of settlers; define State responsibility in the matter of 
unlawful population transfer, including the implantation of settlers; provide for the criminal 
responsibility of individuals involved in population transfer, whether such individuals be private or 
officials of the State.’291 The Special Rapporteur on his part suggested the adoption of a declaration 
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which would re-affirm everyone’s right to remain in their home, land and country and which would 
prohibit displacement, a violation of which would give rise to both state responsibility and criminal 
prosecution of the perpetrator.292 Rather than a call for a declaration however, this contribution argues 
that it is now necessary to have a legally binding instrument to this effect. 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the forcible uprooting of individuals from their lands and homes as 
the direct or indirect consequence of armed conflict and serious human rights violations has not only 
diminished but it continues to increase. This is despite the significant evolution of international law in 
the last century whereby the individual possesses fundamental human rights and the state no longer 
enjoys absolute sovereignty. This demonstrates that the existing international legal system has been 
inadequate to prevent and end the displacement of people against their will which is still often 
intentionally pursued to achieve territorial gains or ‘homogeneity’ along ethnic, racial and religious 
lines.  
 
This chapter has exposed some of the challenges that forced displacement because of armed conflict 
and serious human rights violations presents as a phenomenon with devastating repercussions on its 
victims and as a serious violation of international law itself. To this effect, it has been shown that 
forced displacement is the breaking of an individual’s link with their land and home which is the result 
of lack of free choice. Such coerced breakage has a dramatic impact on the well-being of the uprooted 
and the dispossessed as land, property and home encompass something more fundamental than merely 
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an economic material value: a sense of refuge, security, belonging and identity293 where the individual 
can develop and prosper in conditions of stability and free from arbitrary interference.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the significance of protection against forced displacement the international legal 
framework has been unable to effectively protect individuals from being unlawfully displaced, 
particularly during armed conflict and other serious human rights violations which remain one of the 
biggest drivers of such displacement. This chapter has shown that whilst forced displacement is 
prohibited under IHL, ICL and IHRL and that it may amount to a war crime and a crime against 
humanity under certain circumstances, failure to match such prohibition with an express general right 
not to be displaced as a fundamental individual right - applicable both in war and in peacetime - has 
undermined efforts for effective and consistent protection.294 The preceding analysis has showcased 
that the international legal framework on forced displacement is still very much fragmented with 
different rules applicable in different contexts such as occupation, inter-state or internal armed conflict, 
during peace, or even depending on the circumstances under which such forced displacement takes 
place. At the same time, this analysis showed that the practice following WWI was inconsistent 
according to which whilst forcible displacement through deportations and forcible transfers was 
punished as an international crime in some contexts it was encouraged in others and was given effect 
through population transfers embodied in international peace agreements. Such population transfers 
were very much driven by the desire to ensure peace and security, even though the lawfulness or even 
the justification for such transfers is, as submitted in this chapter, subject to dispute.  
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More recently, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement contributed significantly to addressing 
the fragmented protection against forced displacement by outlining the framework governing forced 
displacement as arising from different legal contexts as mentioned above.295 Nevertheless, the non-
legal character of the Guidelines as well as the fact that they are restricted to the displacement of those 
who have not crossed an international border, presents its own legal limitations. To address this legal 
gap, this chapter provided detailed evidence in support not only of an indirect recognition of the right 
not to be displaced through norms prohibiting forced displacement, but also its direct recognition as a 
right embodied in international customary law through state practice and opinio juris. Importantly, the 
preceding analysis has demonstrated that the right not to be displaced by force does indeed qualify as 
a fundamental human right as it aims to safeguard the individual from the arbitrary interference of the 
state as well as to protect fundamental community values.296 As also highlighted in the preceding 
analysis, the significance that the recognition of such right bears lies in the ability of the individual to 
make a legal claim against the party that violates its international obligations. Whilst truly the 
effectiveness of such legal claim depends heavily also on the ability of the individual concerned to 
have access to appropriate mechanisms and remedies, it nevertheless provides them a legal 
empowerment to demand respect of their rights from all parties concerned, whether states or non-state 
actors and to be protected from forced displacement, before such displacement is given effect. Surely, 
and as Stavropoulou points out, ‘if the patchwork of international law currently in force leads to 
"chronic lack of implementation," then it may be time to rethink seriously on the lack of protection 
from displacement.’297 Recognition of the right not to be displaced aims to ‘define explicitly what is 
now only implicit in international law’.298 Whilst there is no illusion that recognition of the right not 
                                                          
295 n111, 7. 
296 n5, 748. 
297 Ibid.  
298 n230, [10]. 
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to be displaced will eliminate human suffering, it is an important step towards a coherent and consistent 
protection from force displacement that occurs as a result of armed conflict or other serious human 
rights violations.  
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